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Abstract 
     With the rapid development of vehicular ad hoc Network (VANET), it is gaining 
significant popularity and receiving increasing attentions from academics and industry 
in security and efficiency. To address security and efficiency issues, a self-
authentication and deniable efficient group key agreement protocol is proposed in this 
paper. This scheme establishes a group between road-side unit (RSU) and vehicles by 
using self-authentication without certification authority, and enhances certification 
efficiency by using group key (GK) transmission method. At the same time, to avoid the 
attacker to attack the legal vehicle by RSU, we adopt deniable group key agreement 
method to negotiation session key (sk) and use it to transmit GK between RSU. In 
addition, vehicles not only broadcast messages to other vehicles, but also communicate 
with other members in the same group. So group communication is necessary in 
VANET. Finally, the security and performance analysis show that our scheme 
is security, meanwhile the verification delay, transmission overheard and message delay 
are more efficient than other related schemes in authentication, 
transmission and communication. 
 
Keywords: Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), Deniable, Group communication, Key 
negotiation 
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 1  Introduction 
VANET is essentially a branch of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) and have 
many prominent features, such as Vehicle moving at high speed, rapidly changing 
topology, short interaction time between nodes and so on. In addition, the nodes of 
VANET compose two parts, one is vehicles equipped with on-board unit (OBU) and 
another is road-side unit (RSU), vehicles communicate with each other as well as RSU 
through open wireless channel[1]. Due to the peculiar attribute of VANET, it can provide 
some security services including traffic information, traffic safety warning and 
infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers. However, VANET also faces 
many challenges, such as security and privacy. Therefore, VANET need to meet some 
security requirements to resist security threats, as follows:  
 Message integrity and authentication: Vehicles could verity that a message is 
indeed sent and signed by another vehicle without being modified by anyone 
 Privacy: Vehicle’s real identity should not be linked to any message, and other 
vehicles or RSU cannot reveal any vehicle’s real identity by analyzing multiple 
messages sent of it.  
 Confidentiality: The message sent to dedicated vehicles should be readable only by 
the dedicated receiver, other vehicles should be unable to decrypt the message. 
 Non-repudiation: To avoid the sender of a message denied that he had sent the 
message, trust authority (TA) could obtain a vehicle’s real identity and related this 
message to the sender. 
 Forward-security and backward-security: The vehicle which leaves the 
communication group should not acquire the new group key and could not 
communicate with original group members. In addition, a new group member 
should be unable to learn the previous group key. 
So, we design a self-authentication and deniable efficient group key agreement 
protocol to meet above security requirements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Some related work is given in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents the system model, bilinear maps and hard problem. 
Section 4 proposed our scheme. Section 5 and Section 6 analyses security and 
performance of the proposed protocol. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2   Related work 
With the development of VANET, the communication technology in it is being 
gradually improved and has been focused on two aspects. One is the communication 
between vehicles and RSUs, and another is the communication between vehicles. 
Because of the short communication range and the vehicle high speed moving, the 
efficiency and security of communication in VANET become extremely significant. To 
address the above problems,[1] and [2] produced the public and private keys by using 
PKI mechanism, and utilized digital signature certification to guarantee the validity of 
the vehicles. But the overhead of the signature, verification and transmission will 
increase rapidly along with the increasing of nodes. The exorbitant cost of transmission 
and calculation make the scheme more and more cannot be adopted. Aiming at the 
problem of communication efficiency, [3]and[4] adopted identity-based cryptography, 
not only reduced the computation process of the public key certificate, but also 
alleviated the computation and transmission overhead. Raya and Hubaux [5] proposed a 
batch verification scheme. In this scheme, the computation efficiency can be 
significantly improved, but it has the problem of privacy. Later, [6] introduced “an 
efficient identity-based batch verification scheme”, in which the efficiency of the 
vehicle certification can be improved. However, both[5] and [6] have privacy issues. 
For the privacy, [7] suggested that every vehicle should be pre-loaded with a large 
number of anonymous public and private keys, and the corresponding public key 
certificates. It avoids being tracked to a certain extent by using this method, but it will 
waste a lot of time on checking the list of revoked certificates. [8], [9] by pre-loading 
the large pseudonym to achieve privacy protection.[10] proposed an efficient vehicle 
group forming technique, vehicles establish a reliable group to enhance the security and 
privacy protection by using trusted communication equipment (TPM, Platform Module 
Trusted). [11] proposed using two kinds of top-level mechanisms of PKI system, which 
are information signature and group signature. In addition, it also adopted batch 
verification method. So, this scheme not only met the requirements of privacy 
protection, but also reduced the computation overhead. 
3   Preliminaries 
3.1 Network Model 
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Fig. 1. System model 
As shown in Fig. 1, the network model of VANET consists of three entities: The 
Trust Authority (TA), RSU at the road side and OBU equipped on mobile vehicles. 
 TA: TA is a trusted certification center of the whole network. It responses to 
register and manages all nodes in the VANET and exposes the true identity of the 
valid vehicles and releases the information of the revoked vehicles. In this paper, 
TA allocate the certificate parameters to RSU and vehicles. As usual, TA is 
assumed powered with sufficient storage capability and infeasible for any adversary 
to compromise.  
 RSU: RSU are densely distributed in the roadside. They connect with TA by wired 
links while using wireless links to vehicles. In this protocol, RSU is used to 
authenticate the validity of the vehicles and negotiate with the vehicles to form the 
group. In addition, it help TA liable of the vehicles which have illegal act. The 
adjacent RSU know each other’s public key and can communicate with them. 
 Vehicles: Vehicles are equipped with OBU, which periodically broadcast traffic 
related status information to improve the road environment, traffic safety, and 
infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers[12].The communication 
among them is based on the DSRC protocol. 
3.2 Bilinear Maps and Hard Problem 
1) Bilinear Maps 
    Let 1G be a cyclic additive group and 2G is a cyclic multiplicative group. Both 
group 1G and 2G have the same prime order q ( k bites, k is the safety parameters of the 
system). Let P be a generator of 1G , aP express P self-increase *qZa∈ times. A mapping 
211: GGGe →× is called bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following properties. 
 Bilinearity： abQPebQaPe ),(),( = for all 1, GQP ∈  *, qZba ∈ .  
 Nondegeneracy： 1),( ≠PPe  
 Computability：There is an efficient algorithm to compute ),( QPe , for any. 1, GQP ∈  
2) Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in 1G (CDH Problem) 
    Let P be the generator of 1G , for all
*, qZba ∈ , give ),,( bPaPP , output abP by the 
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A . The probability of success is defined as  
1
*
, Pr[ ( , , ) : , ]
CDH
A G R qSucc A P aP bP abp a b Z= = ∈  
   CDH Assumption: CDHGASucc 1, is a negligible value for all the PPT algorithm A . 
3) Decide Diffie-Hellman problem in G (DDH Problem) 
      Let G be a special cyclic multiplicative group, P is the safety parameter, and it 
satisfies 12 += qp . Let g be the generator of the cyclic group >=< gG' , 'G is quadratic 
residue class of model P . Define the function {  )( :            qxifx pxqifxpxff < <<−= . Through function f , 
define G： }|)({ qi ZigfG ∈= . Define the exponent arithmetic in )mod(:: pafaG bb = , Gba ∈, . 
The DDH problem inG is that for ),,,( ryx gggg , Gryx R∈,, , exist a PPT algorithm A which 
output is 1/0 ,output1when xyr = ; Otherwise, output 0 . The advantage of A solve the 
DDH problem inG define as follows: 
:]1),,,((Pr[]1),,,((Pr[|, =−==
xyyxxyyxDDH
GA ggggAggggAADv  Gryx R∈,,  
   DDH Assumption: DDHGAADv , is a negligible value for all the PPT algorithm A which 
output is 1/0 . 
4. Proposed Scheme 
    In this section, we describe our scheme with the following process: system 
initialization, the deniable group key negotiation of RSU, the authentication between 
RSU and Vehicles, the negotiation and update of the group key between RSU and 
Vehicles, the communication among the group. The notations used throughout the paper 
are listed in Table 1. 
4.1 System Initialization 
 Given the parameters ),,,,,,( 2,1 gpGeqPGG ,which satisfy the description in Section 
3.2, TA initializes the system by the following steps: 
1) TA chooses a random number *qTA Z∈ψ  as its private key TASK and compute the 
public key TAgPKTA ψ= ; 
2) TA chooses two cryptographic hash functions： **1*:1 }1,0{:,}1,0{ qZhGH →→ ; 
3) TA chooses a security symmetric cryptographic )(⋅kE , and then TA publishes the 
system parameters, which include ())),(),(,,,,,,,,( 12,1 KTA EhHPKgpGeqPGG ⋅⋅ and 
downloads these parameters into RSU and Vehicles. 
 RSU require to download the system parameters by TA before being installed to the 
appropriate location. TA distributes a true identity
iRSU
TID to iRSU and chooses a 
random *qi Z∈ξ as its private key iRSUSK and computes the public key ii gPKRSU
ξ= , the 
certification parameters )(1 ii RSURSU TIDHQ = and ii RSUTARSU Qs ψ= . Then download the 
public key, the private key and the certification parameters into iRSU . At the same 
time, download other sRSUi ' public keys which is located nearby regions. 
TABLE 1 NOTATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
Notations Descriptions 
ii VVi
FIDTIDV ,,  Vehicle iV , true name, pseudonym 
iRSU
TIDR,  RSU , true name 
m message 
UU SQ ,  The certification parameters of the nodeU  
TS  Time stamp 
U  The nodeU ,vehicle or RSU  
1±iRSU  The RSU nearby
iRSU  
),( UU SKPK  The public and private key of the nodeU  
)(⋅
USK
σ  The signature of the nodeU  
GK  Group Key between RSU and vehicles 
jiVVK ,  The shared key among vehicle iV and jV  
)(⋅kHMAC  The message authentication by symmetric keyk  
)(⋅kE  Encrypt by keyk  
pid  The set of all users’TID  who participate in the process 
      sk  The session key in Group of RSU  
 
 Vehicles also require to download the system parameters by TA before they used. 
TA distributes a true identity
iV
TID to vehicle iV , then TA computes the certification 
parameters )(1 ii VTIDHQV = , ii VTAV Qs ψ= and downloads them into it. In order to ensure 
vehicles could not traced by the malicious nodes, when vehicles enter a new range 
of RSU, it will motivate the key generator to generate the private key * , qiiV ZSK i ∈= αα , 
the public key i
i
gPKV
α= and pseudonym )(1 TAiVV PKHTIDFID ii ∗⊕= α  
4.2 Deniable group key negotiation of RSU 
   We adopted two-round deniable group key agreement protocol[13] , which is used to 
establish a confidential channel for communications. Simultaneously, it allows 
participants to deny that they have ever participated in group key agreement. Firstly, we 
contract a group (it include all RSU) and then generate the session key (sk) between 
RSU by using deniable group key agreement, which is the preparation work for the 
group key transmission mechanism. The purposed is to prevent the attacker to track the 
legitimate vehicles from RSU and ensures the security of group key transmission. The 
deniable group key negotiation of RSU as follows: 
   Step 1: 
jRSU random select qjjj Ztrx ∈,, compute j
x
j gX = , j
r
j gR = , j
t
j gT = , then 
broadcast message ))(),,,(,(1 ⋅=
jRSUjRSUj SKjjjSKRSUj
TRXETIDM σ . 
   Step 2: iRSU receives all the message ijnjjM ≠⋅⋅⋅∈ },,,1{
1}{ , decodes it and gets },,{ jjj TRX , 
then proceeds as following types: 
   1. Compute ii xi
R
i
x
i
L
i XYXY 11 , +− == , 
L
i
R
ii YYY /= . 
   2. Compute )||||||||||||( 21 pidXXXYYHv nRiLii = , here ||||||( 21 ⋅⋅⋅= RSURSU TIDTIDhpid   
)
nRSU
TID  , and using iRSUiSK ξ= compute iiii vrs ξ⋅−=   . 
   3. Using ir compute }),1,1,,1{(, niijTT i
r
jji  +−== . 
   4. Broadcast ))(),,,,,,,,(,( ,1,1,1,2 ⋅= +− iRSUiRSUi SKniiiiiiiiSKRSUi TTTTsYETIDM σ Session key 
generation
jRSU receives all message ijnjiM ≠∈ ),,,1(
2}{

, proceeds as follows: 
    1. Verify }),1,1,,1{(, njjiRT j
t
iji  +−==  holds or not. If it holds, continues, else, 
stop.  
    2. Compute R njnjR njRjjRjRjjRj YYYYYYYYY )2()1()1(12211 ˆˆ,,ˆˆ,ˆ −+−+−++++++ ⋅=⋅⋅⋅⋅=⋅= and confirm 
R
nj
L
j YY )1(ˆ −+= . If it holds to all iRSU , continues, else, cease. 
    3. All iRSU compute )||||||||ˆ||ˆ(ˆ 11 pidXXYYHv n
R
i
R
ii −= , verify. If it holds to all iRSU , 
continues, else, cease. 
    4. Compute 13221ˆˆˆ 21 xxxxxxRnRR ngYYYsk +++=⋅⋅⋅⋅=  . 
4.3 The authentication between RSU and vehicles 
With the RSU as the center, which has a wide range of communication and strong 
computing power, establish the group according to the geographic area on the road. 
After the vehicle get into the range of RSU, vehicles need to verify identity and 
negotiating key to join the group. And then vehicles can communicate with nearby 
vehicles and RSU. In this paper, the authentication is going on between RSU and 
vehicles without TA participating in it. At the same time, the legal vehicle will be 
authenticated with few times by using group key transmission mechanism. The 
authentication between
iRSU and vehicle iV is shown in Fig. 2 
iRSU iV
1: ( , , ( ), ( , , ( ))
i i i TA i i iRSU R R SK RSU R R
Meg PK Loc h Loc PK Loc h Locσ
11 1
2 : (( , , ( ), ( , )), (.))
i RSU i RSU iiV GK V PK V N
Meg PK TS E FID E FID N HMAC
−
1 11
3: ( (( , ), , (.)))
i iN RSU RSU N
Meg E T N Q TS HMAC
1 11
4 : ( (( , , , ), , (.)))
i i i iN V V V V N
Meg E FID T N Q K TS HMAC
 
Fig. 2. The authentication between iRSU and iV  
Step 1: Each RSU store the signing message ))(,,(
iiiTA RSURSURSUSK
LochLocPKσ which 
promulgate by TA. Here )(
iRSU
Loch is hash operation on location information of 
iRSU . iRSU Periodically broadcast message ),(,,(:1 iii RSURSURSU LochLocPKMeg  
)))(,,(
iiiTA RSURSURSUSK
LochLocPKσ . 
Step 2: When it gets into the communication scope of
iRSU , vehicle iV received 1Meg . 
iV gets )(,, iii RSURSURSU LochLocPK , verifies ))(,,( iiiTA RSURSURSUSK LochLocPKσ . If it corrects, 
compute )('
iR
Loch by using
iRSU
Loc . If formula (1) holds, 
iV completes the authentication 
of iRSU , else, discards the message. 
                          )(')(
?
ii RR
LochLoch =                         (1) 
Step 3: If vehicle
iV completed the step 2, then it chooses a random number 1N and 
sends message ))()),,(),(,,((:2
11 1
⋅
− NVPKVGKV
HMACNFIDEFIDETSPKMeg
iRSUiiRSUi
to
iRSU . 
Step 4: iRSU receives the message 2Meg verify time stampTS and calculates TSCTt −=∆ , 
here CT is current time. If t∆ meets the network delay, finishes theTS verification, else 
discards the message. By using private key to decode ),( 1NFIDE iRSU VPK , iRSU  obtains 
1N , iVFID . Then calculates )('1 ⋅NHMAC and compares with )(1 ⋅NHMAC , if them unequal, 
discards the message, else fetch the stored group key GK which be transfer from the 
nearby RSU. Then, gets
iV
FID' from )(
1 iGK
FIDE
iRSU ±
to compare
iV
FID' and
iV
FID . If they 
equal, it explains that
iV has been authenticated by the nearby RSU. So, the 
authentication is completed, executed the negotiation of the group key. Else 
iRSU chooses a random number *qZ∈α and computes PT iRSU α= , then sends 
)))(),,(((:3
11 1
⋅NRSURSUN HMACQNTEMeg ii to iV . 
Step 5: iV received 3Meg , gets iRSUT and verify )(1 ⋅NHMAC . Then iV chooses a random 
number *qZ∈β , computes PT iV β= , ),(),( 11 iiii RSUVTARSUV TsNePKQNeK β= , and sends :4Meg  
)))(),,,,(((
11 1
⋅NVVVVN HMACKQNTFIDE iiii to iRSU . 
Step 6: iRSU receives the 4Meg , obtains iiii VVVV KQNTFID ,,, 1 from it, verify )(1 ⋅NHMAC and 
calculates ),(),( 11 iiii VRSUTAVRSU TsNePKQNeK α= . If formula (2) holds, iRSU finishes the 
authentication to
iV , else, discards the message.   
        ),(),(),(),( 11
?
11 iiiiii VRSUTAVRSUVTARSU
TsNePKQNeTsNePKQNe αβ =             (2) 
4.4 The negotiation and update of the group key 
1) The negotiation of the group key 
After the vehicle has been completed the authentication, it requires to communicate 
with RSU and other vehicles. Therefore, the vehicle need to join in the group centered 
on RSU and negotiate the group key ( GK ). The negotiation between iRSU and iV is shown 
in Fig. 3 
  Step 1: Vehicle iV chooses a random number *qi Z∈λ , computes ig λ and send :1Pag  
)))(),,(((
11
⋅NiN HMACgFIDE i
λ to iRSU . 
   Step 2: iRSU receives the message 1Pag , get igFIDi λ, from it. Then chooses a random 
number *qZ∈γ , computes
γλγλ ii gg
n
i 1
,
=
∏ , new group key γλγ iggGK
n
i 1
*
=
∏= , and then sends :2Pag  
)))(),,(((
11 1
⋅∏
=
N
n
i
N HMACggE ii
γλγλ to
iV , broadcast )))(||)(((:3 '' ⋅GKGK MACGKEPag to the primary 
group members. Here 'GK is the primary group key.  
iRSU
iV
)))(),,(((:1
11
⋅NiN HMACgFIDEPag i
λ
)))(),,(((:2
11 1
⋅∏
=
N
n
i
N HMACggEPag ii
γλγλ
)))(||)(((:3 '' ⋅GKGK HMACGKEPagBroadcast
 
Fig. 3 The negotiation of the group key between iRSU and iV  
  Step 3: iV receives 2Pag , decodes it to get
γλγλ ii gg
n
i 1
,
=
∏ , computes iigg λγλγ −= )( and 
γλγ iggGK
n
i 1
*
=
∏= . Here iV has joined in the group which formed by iRSU . 
The group key transmission scheme:
iRSU sends )(GKEsk to the nearby RSU through the 
wire communication when GK has updated.  
2) The update of the group key 
In order to guarantee the communication of primary group members do not be affect 
and the leaved vehicle cannot communicate with the group members. The group key 
require to be update when vehicles join or leave the group. 
Step 1: When vehicle
iV has leaved the scope of iRSU , iRSU chooses a random number 
*
qZ∈γ , computes
γλig of every group members except
jV and their sum )( 1
1
1
γλig
n
i
j
+
−
∏∏ . Broadcast 
)))(),(),,(),(),,(),(((:1 '
1
1
1
' 1
1
1
1
1
1 ⋅∏∏⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅
+
−
+
+
−
−
GK
n
i
j
VVVVGK HMACgFIDgFIDgFIDgFIDgEBm in
n
j
j
j
j γλγλγλγλγλ     
Step 2: The group member
iV receives 1Bm . According gets
γλig and )(
1
1
1
γλig
n
i
j
+
−
∏∏ by using 
the primary group key 'GK to decode it and according to
iV
FID . Then computes 
iigg λγλγ −= )( and the new group key )(*
1
1
1
γλγ iggGK
n
j
j
+
−
∏∏=  
4.5 The communication among the group 
1) The broadcast communication 
Vehicle
iV broadcast )))(,,( ⋅GKVGK HMACFIDmE i if it wants to broadcast message m to 
other vehicles. 
2) Communication between vehicles and RSU 
When iV wants to send a message m to iRSU , sends ))()),(,(( 11 ⋅NNV HMACmEFID i  to iRSU . 
3) Communication between vehicles 
If iV needs one to one communication with jV , they require to execute this 
communication process as shown in Fig. 4 
iRSUiV jV
, ,
3 : ( (( ( ), ), (.)))
i j i i jGK VVK V VVK
Wod E E m FID HMAC
, ,
( || || (.))
i j i jVVK j VVK
E m FID HMAC
))(),((:1 ⋅GKGK HMACCEWord
)))(),,(),(((:2
1
1 ⋅⋅⋅⋅ GKVVGK HMACFIDgFIDgEWod n
nγλγλ
 
Fig. 4 The communication between iV and jV  
Step 1:
iV sends )))(),(((:1 ⋅GKGK HMACCEWod to iRSU , here C is a fixed value, it explains the 
request of one to one communication. 
Step 2: iRSU receives 1Wod , obtains C by using GK decode it and according to 
C broadcast the message )))(),,(),(((:2
1
1 ⋅⋅⋅⋅ GKVVGK HMACFIDgFIDgEWod n
nγλγλ . 
   Step 3:
iV receives 2Word verifies )(⋅GKHMAC .Then obtains
γλig according to
jV
FID , 
computes γλλ jigVVK ji =, , and then sends )))(,),((((:3 ,, ⋅jiji VVKiVVKGK HMACFIDmEWod to jV . 
  Step 4:
jV receives 2Wod and 3Wod , obtains
γλig , computes γλλ jigVVK ji =, and verifies 
)(
,
⋅
jiVVK
HMAC , if it is true, receives the message m . 
5. Analysis Of The Proposed Scheme 
   In this section, we will analysis the scheme from security requirements which have 
been referred to in Introduction. 
1)  Message confidentiality 
   For the authentication and negotiation in section 4.4, message is protected by the 
shared secret key 1N , the cipher text under symmetric encryption cannot leak any 
information about message. The broadcast in section 4.5, confidentiality is protected by 
the shared secret group key and the confidentiality of one to one communication is 
protect by the shared secret key
jiVVK . between the vehicles. 
2) Message integrity and authentication 
    This scheme use )(mEk and )(mHMACk to realize the message integrity and 
confidentiality of message m . Now show that the attacker cannot generate a valid 
signature. 
   Have an assumption that the shared key k is kept secret, then a node message cannot 
be forged by the attacker, and the scheme is secure against existential forgery, adaptive 
chosen message attack under random oracle model. First, consider the Game between 
the challenger and the attacker. 
     Setup: The challenger starts by giving the attacker a set system parameters. 
     Challenge: The challenger asks the attacker to pick a random message m and sign 
it to generate )(mEk and )(mHMACk . 
     Guess: Finally, the attacker sends )(mEk and )(mHMACk to the challenger. 
     The attacker’s advantage is defined to be )(mEk and )(mHMACk are valid signatures. 
The scheme is secure against existential forgery, adaptive chosen message attack if the 
attacker’s advantage is negligible. 
     In section 4.3, 1Nk = is the shared key between iV and iRSU . iV encodes 1N by 
iRSU
PK and transfers it to iRSU . However, only iRSU has iRSUSK to decode it and get 1N . So, 
only
iV and iRSU know the key 1N . In section 4.5 the shared key between iV and jV is 
γλλ jigVVK ji =, . However, ji λλ , is respectively held by iV and jV , it do not be transferred. 
According to the difficulty problem, it is known that only
iV and jV can compute jiVVK ,  
   The above analysis shows that the attacker cannot obtain the shared secret key, and 
cannot forge any valid message. So, the attacker’s advantage is negligible and our 
scheme is secure. 
3) Identity privacy 
   The message which sent by
iV only contained pseudonym iVFID , the public key 
iV
PK and
iV
QN1 . Vehicles will generate a new random iα when it gets into the scope 
of RSU . So pseudonym )*( TAiVV PKTIDFID ii α⊕= and the public key ii gPKV
α= of one 
vehicle is diffident within the scope of different RSU. Therefore, the attacker cannot 
attack the vehicle by pseudonym and the public key. According to CDH problem which 
has been mention in section 3.2(2), the attacker cannot compute
iV
Q from
iV
QN1 . 
However,
iV
QN1 is also different in the scope of different RSU. Therefore, the attacker 
also cannot attack the vehicle by
iV
QN1 . 
4) Non-repudiation 
   To avoid the vehicle deny ever sent the message which led to the accident, TA 
should be able to reveal the true identity of the sender from the message. In this scheme, 
TA can get the pseudonym from the message, and get the public key of the sender with 
RSU assist. Then, TA uses its private key, the public key
iV
PK of the sender and the 
pseudonym  to have a computation as following:   
       
iiiiiii VVViVVVV
TIDPKsHPKHTIDPKsHFIDTID =⊕⊕=⊕= )*()*()*( 111 λ  
    Finally, TA obtain the true identity
iV
TID of sender, and in addition to TA and the 
vehicle itself, the other participants cannot know
iV
TID . Therefore, our scheme is non-
repudiation. 
5) Forward-security and backward-security 
     When the vehicle
jV has left the scope of iRSU , iRSU random selects *qZl∈ and 
computes the new group key is )(*
1
1
1
lr
n
j
j
l iggGK
+
−
∏∏= . The vehicle jV only know 
))(,,,,,
1
1
1
1121 γλγλγλγλγλγλ injj gggggg
n
j
j
+
−
∏∏⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅ +−（ , but could not know the new γλ jg . According 
to the DDH problem, 
jV cannot compute
γg and the new group key. Therefore, our 
scheme is forward-secure. When the vehicle
iV joined in the group, it received the 
message by RSU to update the group key. However the message is encode by the 
previous group key, vehicle cannot decode it and get the previous group key. So, our 
scheme is backward-secure.   
6. Performance Evaluation 
    In this section, we compare with some related work from verification delay and 
transmission overheard, then have a simulation on message delay by NS2.34. 
6.1 Verification delay 
The experiment is running on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ machine proposed in 
reference[14]. According to [6], the following results are obtained: the time of a pairing 
operation parT is 4.5ms, the time of performing one point multiplication over an elliptic 
curve mulT is 0.6ms and the time of a MapToPoint hash operation mtpT is 0.6ms. The 
computation cost of the message certification mainly focus on the above three 
parameters, any other operations are not considered, such as each HMAC operation is 
assumed to take 0.006ms. TABLE 2 shows the comparison of verification delay of other 
schemes. 
TABLE 2 COMPARISION OF VERIFICATION DELAY  
 
Scheme 
Complete n verification 
OBU RSU 
IBV[6] mtpmul nTnT 25 +  mtpparmul nTTTn +++ 3)1(  
ECPP[16] parmul nTnT +4  parmul nTnT 32 +  
RMAKA[17] mulnT4  mulnT4  
ACP[15] mulnT  mulpar TnT )12(3 ++  
Our scheme parmulmtp nTnTnT 25 ++  parmul nTnT 24 +  
 
Fig. 5 illustrates that the verification delay radio compared with others scheme for 
RSU verify the vehicles when the illegal vehicles is 5%. From the Fig. 5, with the 
increase of certified vehicles, the ratio of ACP, IBV are on the rise, but they are less 
than 1. Therefore, the verification delay of our scheme is less than them. And compared 
with the ECPP, RMAKA, the verification speed of our scheme is about 94% faster than 
that of ECPP, and is about 75% faster than that of RMAKA. 
 
Fig 5 Traffic density and Verification delay radio 
6.2 Transmission overhead 
TABLE 3． COMPARISONS OF TRANSMISSION OVERHEAD 
 
Scheme 
      Send n messages (bytes) 
RSUOBU →  
RMAKA[17] 167n 
ABAKA[19] 84n 
ARGBV[20] 63n 
Our scheme 58n 
    
   According to reference[18] , each vehicle send message every 300ms. In this paper, 
the length of pseudonym is 42bytes and HMAC is 16bytes. Fig. 6 and TABLE 3 
illustrates that the transmission overhead of RMAKA, ABAKA, ARGBV and our 
scheme. From the Fig. 6, we can see the transmission overhead of us is least. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Traffic density and Transmission overhead 
6.3 Simulation 
1) The simulation parameter 
The main simulation parameters are list in TABLE 4 
TABLE 4. SIMULIATION PARAMETERS   
Simulation parameters Value 
Road length 1000 m 
Simulation time 20 s 
Message size 200 bytes 
Broadcast interval 300 ms 
Interval variance 0.05 s 
Communication Range of RSU and Vehicles 600 m 
Communication Range of Vehicles 300 m 
Bandwidth 6 Mbps 
 
2) Message delay 
    We define the average delay of a message as [15]: 
)(11
11
kmn
Verify
kmn
onTransmissi
M
m
mn
Creat
N
n i
TTT
MN
Delay −−−−
=
−
=
++= ∑∑  
Here N is the number of the vehicles, iM is the number of messages sent by vehicle 
iV , mnCreatT − is the time that the Vehicle or RSU create the message, kmn onTransmissiT −− is the 
transmission time that entity n sent message to entity k , kmnVerityT
−− is the time that 
entityk verify the message from entity n. 
 
Fig. 7 The message delay and traffic density 
    Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of vehicle’s number versus average delay. In this paper, 
the communication of us divided on two aspects. One is between OBU, and another is 
between RSU and OBU. Fig. 7 shows that the message delay also increase with the 
increase of vehicle number. The message delay of ABAKA, ARGBV and RMAKA are 
bigger than us. So, with the increase of vehicle quantity, the message delay of our 
scheme is least.   
7. Conclusions 
   In this paper, we proposes a self-authenticated deniable efficient group key 
agreement scheme in VANET. The features of the scheme as following: (1) Employ the 
no certificate public key system, the authentication process between vehicles and RSU 
has no authentication center participated in, avoid the time delay problem of TA 
certificate to speed up the certification. (2) Reduce the frequency of legal vehicles’ 
certification and avoid tracking legal vehicles through RSU by using the deniable group 
key transmission scheme. (3) In order to alleviate the workload of the group leader and 
eliminate the possible single point of failure problem by using key negotiation instead 
of the group leader distribute group key. In the future, we will have a further research on 
how the vehicles build the group for secure communication by themselves on the way 
of no public infrastructure.   
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